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oday, the Republic of Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation 
in the world, is home to around 246 000 000 people and more than 
300 ethnic groups. Geographically, it stretches over 17 500 islands, 
the largest of which are Sumatra (164 000 square miles), Celebes (67 400 
square miles) and Java (48 900 square miles). From the arrival of the first 
traders in the late sixteenth century, Dutch control spread tenuously 
through the archipelago. Prior to 1945, this area was the Netherlands 
East Indies: Indonesia did not exist, though the term had come into 
usage arguably from the 1850s. The earliest nationalist movement, the 
Budi Utomo, declared itself in 1908, heralding decades of struggle for 
independence. In August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, 
Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, nationalist political leaders, declared 
Indonesian Independence. Thus began the Indonesian Revolution. Four 
years later, on 27 December, Indonesia became a sovereign state. But its 
national history was to be littered with civil war, regional uprisings in 
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the later 1950s and early 1960s, economic problems, conflict between 
communists and anti-communists, corruption and a coup on 1 October 
1965 which provided an ostensible reason for the murder of at least half 
a million people, most of whom were communists.1 
As in other nation-states, public histories were to become critical to 
galvanising the new, extremely diverse and unstable Indonesian nation. 
Indeed, as David Thelen has observed, 
 
Modern professional historical scholarship grew up alongside the 
nation-state. Its mission to document and explain the rise, reform, 
and fall of nation-states. And professional history developed a civic 
mission to teach citizens to contain their experience within nation-
centred narratives.2 
 
David Christian has also noted the substantial political and financial 
support that nationalist governments have provided to historians to craft 
public histories ‘to inspire loyalty’.3 Indonesia was no exception. As in 
many other places, too, the business of constructing national narratives 
saw some events and people disappear or reappear somehow altered. 
Between 1957 and 1966, under the charismatic though increasingly 
authoritarian leadership of President Sukarno, Indonesia was ruled by a 
doctrine of ‘Guided Democracy’. Giving greater powers to the military, 
political representation was primarily achieved through groupings such 
as workers, women and the military. This was a key strategy of the 
Indonesian Revolution to achieve national unification. A critical glue in 
this process was national history. As Vickers has written, the regime 
‘claimed ancient kingdoms as predecessors for the modern state. To this 
vision of ancient greatness, Sukarno and his ministers added a pantheon 
of “national heroes”’.4 These were mainly leaders in the nationalist 
movement as well as a few women and a number of religious figures, 
thus giving each group a place in the national story. Monuments and 
memorials were erected to the vision and its champions, new traditions – 
such as folk dances – were invented and Haussmannian-style 
thoroughfares were driven through prominent parts of the capital, 
Jakarta. 
Some challenged this revisionist history. Novelist Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer had earlier and famously written about the people’s 
struggle to achieve independence though the Revolution. While a 
supporter of national unification and, for a time, Suharto’s methods for 
achieving it, he was imprisoned for his outspoken support for the leftist 
cause from 1965 to 1978 and spent a further thirteen years under house 
arrest in Jakarta.5 The spur to his and many other people’s incarceration 
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was the 1965 coup. A watershed in Indonesian history, the coup allowed 
General Suharto to launch a counter coup and ultimately seize power 
ushering the ‘New Order’ in from 1966. The ‘New Order’ Government’s 
ideology rested on the 1945 Constitution and Five State Principles – 
Pancasila – which, written by Sukarno, were the belief in one God, just 
and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, democracy under the wise 
guidance of representative consultations and social justice for all the 
peoples of Indonesia.6 It replaced Sakarno’s principle of Nasakom – 
nationalism, religion and communism – now that communism had been 
discredited after the coup by a massive propaganda campaign. Under 
this new national ideology, the ‘people were the “floating mass”… who 
needed guidance so they would not be lured into politics’.7 Strict, official 
guidance was to be given to how Indonesia’s past should be presented 
and remembered in public. (The ‘evidently active and potent, if still 
murky, role of the United States, Britain and Australia in the events leading 
up to the great killings of 1965-66’ is not addressed in this article.)8 
After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, public debates over the 
nature of history proliferated. While focusing on a number of key 
national events, most notably the 1965 coup and the mass killings – 
separate but causally events which are often conflated – these debates 
have raised critical issues over the role or potential role of public history 
in contemporary Indonesian society. Questions of historical authority are 
paramount as Indonesian historians, public intellectuals and politicians 
struggle with a deeply entrenched historical paradigm and narratives of 
the old ‘New Order’ which continue to inform history in schools, 
cultural institutions, the media, literature, personal narratives, public 
rituals and the academy. This paradigm was based on an unquestioning 
or reluctant acceptance of official accounts of the past in an environment 
of fear. 
 
THE SACRED PANCASILA MONUMENT 
Opened in 1969 at Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), the Sacred Pancasila 
Monument (Monumen Pancasila Sakti) is arguably the most powerful 
work of public history in Indonesia. It features seven bronze, lifesize 
statues of seven military officers standing in front of a five-metre tall 
Garuda, Indonesia’s national symbol. Below the officers is a ten-metre 
long bas-relief frieze depicting the violent murder of the officers by 
communist men – members of the 30 September Movement which 
supposedly sough to overthrow the government – with almost naked 
communist women dancing sadistically around them wearing garlands 
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Above and below, the Sacred Pancasila Monument (Monumen Pancasila Sakti) at 
Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), 2012 (Photographs Paul Ashton) 
 
 
 
Public History Review | Ashton, Brahmantyo & Keaney 
 
90 
of flowers. The frieze further demonises the Indonesian Communist 
Party (Partaai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) by depicting it as a wicked  
agitator in postcolonial Indonesia. Its narrative stops in October 1965 
with Suharto vanquishing the PKI and bringing order to the nation. This 
is strongly reinforced in the Museum Pengkhianatan PKI on the same 
site which misrepresents the history of Indonesian communism. 
For many, perhaps most Indonesians, this familiar narrative has 
become part of the country’s social memory. Social memory, as Fentress 
and Wickham remind us, is concerned with ‘an understanding of the 
meaning the past has for people, whether they experienced it directly or 
had it recounted to them, or, indeed, read about it in a book’.9 One 
Jakarta tourist website, for example, notes of this venerated site: 
 
It was a very disastrous and horrific moment in 
Indonesia’s historical timeline.10 
 
Another provides a description of the place: 
 
Located southeast of Jakarta maybe 20 kilometers from 
central Jakarta, you will find a park honouring the 
memory of six army generals and an officer slain in a 
poorly co-ordinated Communist-style coup d'etat. You 
will find the main attractions are the statues as part of the 
Pancasila monument showing the seven heroes near a well 
that they were apparently thrown into after being tortured 
and murdered by the communist death squads.11 
 
Historians, among others, continue to dispute interpretations of the 
events which took place over the first few days in October 1965. Were 
the officers sadistically mutilated? According to Benedict Anderson, 
based on the visum et repertum from the official doctors, there were no 
such mutilations.12 Who organised the coup? As a General himself, why 
wasn’t Suharto captured and executed by the 30 September Movement? 
Was Suharto aware of the Movement? Was he involved in it? Debates 
have divided the Indonesian historical profession into pro-official and 
anti-official schools of thought. Much of the debate focuses on the issue 
of empirical evidence. For the American historian John Roosa, however, 
the ‘claim that the PKI organized the movement was, for the Suharto 
regime, not any ordinary fact; it was the supreme fact of history from 
which the very legitimacy of the regime was derived’.13 
The short-lived coup and the 30 September Movement have become 
icons in Indonesian historiography, overshadowing other events and 
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groups in Indonesia’s recent national past. For Indonesian politics, the 
power of the Sacred Pancasila Monument lies in it being both the shrine 
of the New Order ideology and the burial place of communism, 
politically and ideologically. Suharto held an annual ceremony on 1 
October for the country and its leaders to reaffirm their faith in 
Pancasila. Even after the New Order regime’s demise, citizens continue 
to observe 1 October. On that day in 2011, for example, ‘Thousands of 
members of the cadre of Barisan Ansor Versatile… perform[ed] in the 
city of Bogor rally to commemorate the miracle of Pancasila Day [Hari 
Kesaktian Pancasila]’.14 Julia Suryakusuma, author and columnist, wrote 
recently of Pancasila Day: 
 
It actually celebrates the foundation of the New Order… 
Much of what really happened back then has long been 
disputed by historians… In any case, the well is now 
marked by a huge monument opened in 1969, complete 
with life-size statues of the seven “martyrs” of Pancasila, 
and a frieze recounting the New Order regime’s version of 
the actions of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) since 
independence. Yep, the New Order foundation myth is 
alive and kicking.15 
 
The myth, however, is not monolithic. Mary Zurbuchen has noted the 
five basic interpretations – some of which are used in combination – of 
the coup. The first is that the PKI was responsible for plotting the 
generals’ murders and carrying them out. The second claims that the 
failed coup was produced by a power struggle within the armed forces. 
The third scenario portrays Suharto as the mastermind behind the coup 
or that he knew about it and used it to gain power. The forth 
interpretation see Sukarno facilitating ‘disaffected officers to act against 
others said to be part of a secret “Council of Generals”’. Finally, foreign 
intelligence agencies – notably the CIA – are ascribed an active role in 
the coup, aiming to bring leftist and influential Sukarno down.16 
The New Order narrative, however, remains dominant. This is not 
surprising in a society that had this narrative drummed into it for three 
decades. During the mid 1990s, challenges to this foundational myth 
emerged. The context included the emergence of the international 
human rights movement which grew out of the civil rights movement in 
the late 1970s and focused its activities on totalitarian regimes, helping to 
bring about a Human Rights Law which passed through the Indonesian 
parliament (the DPR) in 1999; the rise of the internet which made 
different narratives more accessible and, depending on the source, more 
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authoritative;17 and economic crisis, brought about in part by deep-
seated and wide-spread corruption in Indonesia. Although Asia was hit 
by a general financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia was deeply affected by the 
collapse of the clove industry – then the second largest source of 
Indonesia’s tax revenue – in that year. The monopoly Clove, Support 
and Marketing Agency (BPPC), formed by Tommy Suharto in 1990, was 
largely responsible for this industry’s collapse.18 
Growing fear and hatred of Suharto and his immediate relatives – 
derisively referred to as ‘the family’ – saw Suharto driven out of office by 
public demonstratons in 1998. He resigned on 21 May. In the immediate 
years leading up to this backlash, a number of publications appeared 
about the coup.19 Some were memoirs. Many were banned. But they 
continued to be read in private and contributed to destabilising the New 
Order version of the coup. After Suharto’s fall, works on the coup 
mushroomed. Contestation over the official version of the coup grew to 
a point where, by the end of 1999, the new President, Adburrahman 
Wahid, attempted publically to address human rights issues and 
interrogate the New Order history. This, combined with an attempt to 
revoke the 1966 decree which outlawed Marxism and Leninism, led to 
political turmoil. Conservative religious leaders slammed Wahid and in 
April 2000 anti-communist student demonstrations broke out in 
Jakarta.20 It was clearly too early for post New Order Indonesia to 
radically revise its national past. 
Moves to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) from 
late 2000 also failed. After four years and two presidential 
administrations, legislation was passed by the DPR which provided the 
process for the establishment of a TRC. Commissioners were nominated 
in 2005. A year later the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) 
ruled that such a body could not entertain claims for ‘compensation, 
restitution, rehabilitation and amnesty… simultaneously’ until it had 
been proven that ‘gross human rights violations had actually occurred.’21 
It was not until July 2012 that the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM) declared that the coup was a ‘gross human rights 
violation’ and urged that military officials involved should be ‘taken to 
court for various crimes, including mass rape, torture and killings’.22 
 
INSTILLING THE NEW ORDER HISTORY 
The shift of government from civilian authoritarianism under Sukarno to 
Suharto’s military authoritarianism began immediately after the 
overthrow of the Old Order government. As soon as Suharto took the 
presidency, he moved to legitimise his government within Indonesia. 
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After the long presidency of the charismatic Sukarno, Suharto had to 
discredit both his predecessor and the ideology of Guided Democracy. 
This was done by eliminating the PKI as well as circulating falsified 
images and accounts of the killing of the generals. The military daily 
newspaper, Angkatan Bersendjata (Armed Forces), played a key role in 
reporting the communist party’s supposed treachery. Next, the regime 
produced and published the official New Order history textbook of the 
communist party rebellion, which ends with the hero Suharto forming 
the New Order.23 Subsequently, many books that in any way challenged 
this interpretation were classified by the government as ‘threats to 
national security’ and banned, though this process was erratic. Finally, 
the Pancasila (Five Principles) was legally prescribed as the state 
ideology and made a compulsory part of moral education for Indonesian 
citizens. 
Under the New Order, tight restrictions were placed on various 
aspects of political life. The state controlled all media and the education 
system. Strict limitations were applied to freedom of speech. And 
elections were manipulated to secure the success of the government 
party, Golkar, at the ballot box. Access to various kinds of historical 
resources such as newspapers and archives was limited by the 
government. Communist party newspapers or any others that were 
considered ‘leftist’ were banned or categorized as restricted materials. 
These publications are still kept in the National Library but they are on 
restricted access. Researchers who wish to use them have to seek 
permission from the government through the National Intelligence 
Coordinating Body (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) and the head of the 
National Library. (This is frustrating for researchers, students and 
prominent Indonesian historians alike who wish to interrogate these 
sources. History students, for instance, still have to choose 
undergraduate thesis topics which are considered ‘not sensitive’ based 
on governmental criteria.) 
The writing of the official history textbook relied heavily on the 
prominent military historian, Nugroho Notosusanto. It was published 
only forty days after the ‘attempted’ coup. As Katharine McGregor has 
put it: 
 
In the case of New Order Indonesia, anti-communist 
ideology outlived the end of the Cold War. One reason for 
this was anti-communism had become so central to the 
legitimation of the New Order. Of all historical events, 
representations of the 1965 coup attempt as a communist 
plot were critical for the regime. 
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to produce the first published version of the coup in days, 
the determination to defend this version to the outside 
world in light of the Cornell Paper [a preliminary analysis 
of the coup by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey24] and 
the progressive and elaborate memorialisation of the well 
at Lubang Buaya all confirm this claim.25 
 
Nugroho Notosusanto was born on 15 June 1931, in Rembang, Central 
Java. He joined the Student Army during the struggle for Independence 
in 1945. While fascinated by military life, he followed his father’s 
suggestion to enrol in the Faculty of Letters in the University of 
Indonesia. After graduating, he worked as a lecturer at the University of 
Indonesia from 1964. His first task as a historian was to write an army 
version of the history of the independence struggle.26 This commission 
was in fact an order from General, A. H. Nasution, chief of staff of the 
armed forces and minister of defence. The aim of this 1964 publication 
was to challenge a rival history said to be planned by the leftist National 
Front which the regime believed would leave out an account of the so-
called Madiun Affair in 1948, a previous communist revolt against the 
government,27 which occurred on 18 September 1948 during the National 
Revolution in the town of Madiun. Leftist parties, the PKI and the 
Indonesia Socialist Party (PSI) led an uprising against the leaders of the 
newly-declared Indonesian Republic. The new Republican forces 
eliminated the uprising. 
In 1983, the New Order government released a four-hour film – the 
film maker called it a docu-drama – of the coup entitled Pengkhianatan G 
30 S PKI (The Treachery of the 30 September Movement). New students at 
the University of Indonesia were the first audience to publically see the 
film. It was part of the indoctrination workshop on Pancasila as the 
National Ideology at that time. The majority of the students believed that 
the film fairly reflected the facts of what was shown to be a tragedy 
perpetrated by the communist party. The docu-drama was then screened 
across the country and was a box office hit, not because everybody 
wanted to see it but because it was compulsory to do so. Nugroho 
Notosusanto was the key person in the making of the film. He developed 
a film script based on the government’s version of the coup. The film was 
first screened and checked by various people including the president 
and senior military figures.28 The filmmakers paid attention to the details 
in reconstruction of the kidnapping of the generals. The kidnapping and 
the death of each general was portrayed as a ‘horror’ to the audience, 
further demonising communists.29 The message of this New Order 
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propaganda to Indonesian youth was that communist party should not 
be allowed to exist in Indonesia. 
Under the New Order, Pancasila moral education was made 
compulsory throughout the country. The subjects started in state 
universities in the early 1980s and in high school in the mid-1980s. Youth 
were indoctrinated against leftist (communist) ideology which was 
categorized as a danger to national unity. Students attend a lecture on 
Pancasila as a national ideology and were required to present a paper on 
it, first in small discussion groups and then to the whole class. At the 
university level this was a compulsory subject which had to be passed. 
In later years all government employees had to take Pancasila 
indoctrination courses. As David Bouchier has observed, this was all 
aimed at create a bond of loyalty between the people and the regime.30 
The propaganda was effective since the authoritarian New Order 
government was the only source of national history. Those who 
expressed different opinions on the nation’s past were considered leftist 
and a potential threat to national security. 
 
FEMINIST VOICES 
There has been a strong emerging commitment to democratisation and 
pluralism through the critical and revisionist histories emanating from 
Indonesia in the wake of the New Order. However, recent work is 
largely marked by deep-seated gender blindness. Mirroring a long line 
of literature on Indonesian politics and history that is authored by and 
focused on the lives of men,31 this is particularly startling when 
considering the misogyny and conservative gender ideology in which 
Suharto’s rise to power and presidency was steeped. Nevertheless, a 
small group of feminist historians and women’s groups are writing 
women back into the often universalising narratives of Indonesian 
history. In doing so, they recognise the specificities of Indonesian 
women’s diverse experiences and their contributions to projects of 
nation building, creating a more democratic and inclusive public history 
landscape in which to ground understandings of Indonesian identity as 
well as contemporary feminist activism. 
Feminist historians face unique challenges in attempting to tell 
women’s histories in public. The conception of ‘truth’ as in flux and ever-
shifting that is embedded in feminist epistemology, as well as the 
recognition of subjectivity and hegemonies of power and discourse lend 
themselves to efforts to make visible lives and experiences that have 
been hidden beneath dominant narratives.32 However, it can be difficult 
to maintain historical authority in a context where empiricist approaches 
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are easier to accommodate and often favoured within national histories. 
This is compounded by the spaces in which women’s histories take place 
– often outside official political realms33 – making them less accessible 
and devalued.34 The evidence available to document women’s histories 
is also sparser and more ephemeral than in other cases, resulting in 
further undervaluing in a context where empirical approaches still hold 
historical authority. These factors are exacerbated in the New Order 
political climate, where women’s organising was actively suppressed 
and much documentary evidence of past activism annihilated. 
Indonesia has long witnessed the development of a strong women’s 
movement, both shaped by and in turn influencing changing political 
climates. As Elizabeth Martyn observes:  
 
The political system and dominant ideologies of a nation-
state impact on and constrain women’s ability to organise, 
determine women’s interests and often set the agenda. 
Women’s mobilization in turn influences these processes 
and contributes to identity-formation.35 
 
The Indonesian women’s movement first clearly emerged in the 1900s, 
closely entwined with growing nationalism and nationalist organisations 
in the colonial period. This phase of the women’s movement focused on 
issues like polygamy, workplace discrimination and access to education, 
and started the first women’s congress on 22-25 December 1928, 
embodying the beginnings of a more organised women’s movement.36 
Despite overtly political aims, it drew much from Western bourgeois 
notions of femininity and modernity, indicative of its colonial 
grounding.37 
The movement ebbed and flowed after Dutch rule, coming under 
closer, militaristic control during Japanese occupation and then framed 
by the egalitarian gender ideology and nationalist sentiments of the 
independence movement whilst struggling against the Japanese and the 
return of the Dutch. When Japanese rule receded, a number of women’s 
organisations tentatively emerged, including the influential umbrella 
women’s group Kowani that is still active today.38 In the early years of 
Sukarno’s republic, women’s organisations once again flourished with 
relatively little government intervention. A significant ideological 
framework was one of the PKI’s nationalist Marxism, and the women’s 
movement was inherently bound up with egalitarian nationalism.39 
However this was underscored by Sukarno’s firm belief in the specific 
kodrat40 of each sex, with women viewed in domestic, caring terms.  
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Somewhat paradoxically, this era also saw the strident rise of 
Gerwani, the women’s organisation of the PKI, which was an overtly 
political feminist voice in the midst of other women’s groups primarily 
focused on social issues that accorded with the female kodrat, like family 
welfare and marriage reform. 41 When Sukarno’s presidential control 
increased through the policy of Guided Democracy from 1958 onwards, 
Gerwani’s power augmented, partly through its ties to the favoured PKI, 
even as other women’s organisations lost autonomy. Nonetheless, the 
feminist movement thrived in the Sukarno period. Many women’s 
 
 
 
Part of the bas-relief frieze on the Sacred Pancasila Monument (Monumen Pancasila 
Sakti) (Photograph Paul Ashton) 
 
organisations emerged to campaign around women’s rights issues, 
giving a voice to Indonesian women’s experience, albeit often framed in 
Marxist-nationalist terms. 
This shifted dramatically with the events preceding the coming to 
power of the New Order, and its subsequent 32-year rule. Though there 
is an increasing body of work scrutinising the New Order’s official 
‘events’ of the coup that took place on 30 September 1965,42 this area of 
focus in particular is marked by the gender-blindness symptomatic of 
Indonesian histories more generally. Despite the centrality of Gerwani 
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women in the official narrative around the coup, mainstream revisionist 
accounts of the coup and New Order history have sidelined or ignored 
this gendered aspect altogether. Women are relegated to what Steven 
Drakely calls a ‘macabre footnote’.43 
It is because of this that feminist work has also tended to group 
around this period in recent years. Feminists have brought to light the 
negatively gendered propagandist sentiment in which the New Order 
foundation narrative44 – the story of the 30 September movement coup – 
was steeped. The official version of the coup specifically positioned 
Gerwani women, rather than other members of the PKI, as the 
perpetrators of the murders. The women were said to have engaged in 
torture, mutilation and castration prior to the executions, underscored by 
broader insinuations of Gerwani women as hypersexual, promiscuous 
and sexually sadistic.45  They were even purported to have performed 
the Dance of the Fragrant Flowers – an allegedly obscene and sexualised 
show – at the site of the murders. Indeed, as noted earlier, this facet of 
the official narrative is literally frozen in the frieze at the Sacred 
Pancasila monument which features Gerwani women performing the 
dance around the soon-to-be murdered officials.46 Testimonies of 
Gerwani members and the official autopsy reports – signed and 
approved by Suharto himself – disprove this interpretation.47 
The misogyny of this foundation story served in many ways to 
legitimise the Suharto regime. The positioning of Gerwani as 
perpetrators served to demonise the group and, by extension, the 
political party of which they were a part – the PKI. Moreover, though, 
the portrayal of the aggressors as women served to otherise and 
demonise the PKI even more in comparison to Suharto’s forces. As 
Drakely notes, ‘although intrinsically horrifying, the alleged murders, 
tortures, and mutilations appeared even more so as the acts of women’.48 
The inversion of gender roles in women straying from caring, passive 
femininity into hypersexuality, aggression and murder served as a 
metaphor for the chaos of communism and the Sukarno regime. By 
extension, this promised a return to traditional morality through the 
New Order.  
It also created the framework for Suharto’s conservative policies on 
women, what Julia Suryakusuma describes as ‘State Ibuism’ – wherein 
women were perceived as dependant, domesticated appendages of their 
husbands.49 In this climate, the New Order was also able to suppress the 
capacity for women to organise overtly in all but the most prescriptive, 
state-sanctioned ways. This was instated partly through the suspicion 
surrounding autonomous women’s organizing that underpinned 
representations of Gerwani members as responsible for the coup. It was 
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reinforced through the conservative gender ideology and totalitarian 
restriction of critique and political analysis that more broadly 
characterized the New Order. Gerwani was all but annihilated through 
banning the group and arresting or killing its members, women’s 
organisations were converted into state-sanctioned wives groups for the 
public service50 and women more generally were pushed out of politics 
and back into the home. As Susan Blackburn has written, the New Order 
had a ‘fixed agenda that discouraged the study of politics or of women 
except in very restricted ways that accorded with its version of Pancasila, 
the state ideology’.51  
Gerwani is still perceived as a radical, communist affiliated group in 
Indonesia despite its disbanding.52 Divisions resound between Gerwani’s 
legacy and other contemporary women’s organisations. The women’s 
umbrella organization Kowani, for example, has in recent years been 
outwardly hostile to Gerwani ideology, attempting to cleanse Gerwani 
supporters from its ranks.53 In this sense, feminist work is not just about 
righting historical wrongs, but also ameliorating the political 
implications that such narratives have for the women’s movement today. 
A notable recent development in feminist historical work on 
Indonesia and the New Order, is Julia Suryakusuma’s book of her 1987 
thesis, State Ibuism: the Social Construction of Womanhood in New Order 
Indonesia, which was published in 2011.54 It was released for the first time 
in Indonesian as well as the original English. This indicates something of 
the new climate of academic freedom and critique in the wake of Suharto 
as well as the active contributions feminists are making to new accounts 
of Indonesian history, in this case opening up critique of the New Order 
years. 
 The overwhelming focus on women’s and feminist oppression 
under the New Order frames women’s history in a particular light. 
Although Indonesia under Suharto was characterised by a clampdown 
on women’s political and social freedom, underscored by a misogynistic 
foundation myth, it is not the only period in Indonesia’s history when 
conservative gender ideologies have been rife. To give primacy to the 
New Order period as the time of oppression in feminist histories can by 
comparison pale the sexism of other periods. The state of women’s rights 
under Japanese occupation (1942-5) is an example. The conservative 
gendered values of this period were magnified by the militaristic nature 
of the regime and women’s primary role was as wives and mothers 
supporting men in the war effort.55 The Japanese occupation in Indonesia 
was also plagued by the mass phenomenon of comfort women,56 an issue 
still shrouded in social taboo and historical invisibility.57 This period in 
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fact bears much in common with New Order gender ideologies, but is 
often omitted from analysis in favour of foregrounding the oppression of 
Suharto’s regime. Indeed, little has been written at all about the 
Indonesian women’s movement under the Japanese.58  
There are some feminist works coming to light in the post-Suharto 
period that address historical issues other than the New Order reign. In 
telling histories of same-sex attracted women59 and trans people,60 and 
voicing the experiences of Islamic women61 and working women62 in 
Indonesia, among other things, a more diverse portrait of Indonesian 
women and feminist movements is made visible. This also serves as a 
counterpoint to the tendency to conflate Indonesian feminism with 
Gerwani as the most radical, active and persecuted women’s 
organisation in Indonesian history.  
Broader history projects and debates must take into account feminist 
readings of history if there is to be a true democratisation and 
pluralisation of social memory and public history in post-New Order 
Indonesia. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On 20 April 1975, the massive Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII) – 
park of beautiful Indonesia in Miniature – was opened by President 
Suharto in East Jakarta. It had been under construction since 1971. 
Suharto’s wife, Tien Suharto, had suggested the idea to engender 
national pride having visited ‘such tourist attractions as Disneyland in 
the United States and Timland in Thailand’.63 There was some public 
disquiet about the deployment of resources into such a scheme, 
including a few tiny student demonstrations. But most Indonesians 
opposed to it did their protesting in private.64 While internal and foreign 
tourism was part of its function, TMII’s principal purpose was 
ideological. It was a national monument to ethnic diversity which 
sanitizes difference. In his address of welcome, later printed in the first 
official guide to TMII, Suharto said that: ‘By visiting this Park we will 
know ourselves better, we will know our nation better and we will love 
our motherland more. Therefore the “Beautiful Indonesia Park” is also a 
real effort to strengthen national development, both now and in the 
future’.65 
The demise of the New Order in Indonesia has left a 
historiographical vacuum which individuals and groups from a broad 
range of perspectives are trying to fill. Some, like Professor Azyumardi 
Azra, are seeking to straddle the divide between professional and public 
history. Memory has emerged as a key issue in public debates, attempts 
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have been made at reconciliation between the left and the right, though 
these faltered, and turf wars have broken out between historians and 
novelists such as the late Pramoedya Ananta Toer. The movement for 
freedom of expression, however, did have a victory. On 15 October 2010 
the 50 year-old law allowing the government to ban books deemed ‘able 
to disrupt public order’ was lifted.66 Publications such as John Roosa’s 
Pretext for Mass Murder began to circulate legally.67 
Public history in Indonesia is at a crossroads. New Order history has 
been successfully challenged but it still holds sway. Public history’s 
future in Indonesia is likely to be a turbid negotiation between state-
sanctioned or sponsored accounts of the past and more democratic forms 
of history. 
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